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A COMPARISON OF MANAGERS' UNCERTAINTY PERCEPTIONS
AND COUNTRY RISK INDICES
This study compares managers' perceptions of political,
government policy, and macroeconomic uncertainties with the ratings
provided by a professional risk assessment service. Survey data from
six Latin American countries indicate rank orderings of the countries
based on managers' uncertainty perceptions differ from the
professional risk assessment rankings.
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In the last two decades, managing the risks associated with doing
business across national borders has become an important concern of
rnanagers. 1 While the growing globalization of many industries provides
a rationale for the increased interest in international risk
management, several events have heightened managers' awareness of
international risks. The 1973-74 oil crisis, the 1978-79 Iranian
revolution, and the political and economic instability of many
indebted nations have drawn managers' attention to the need for
incorporating country risk assessments into MNE strategic decisions.
Opportunities for new ventures in centrally-planned and reforming
economies call for careful political risk assessment. In response,
many multinational firms havp jeveloped internal quantitative and
qualitative procedures for conducting on-going country risk
assessments. International business researchers have provided
guidelines for developing MNE internal risk assessment capabilities
(Brewer, 1981; Bunn & Mustafaoglu, 1978; Rice & Mahmoud, 1986; Simon,
1982, 1984).
In addition, a number of professional rating services have arisen
to meet corporate demanG for country risk assessments. Major risk
rating services include Business Environmental Risk Information
(BERI), Political Risk Services (PRS), Business International Country
Assessment Service (CAS), International Reports' International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG), and Nikkei's Business Index (NBI). Each of these
risk assessment services provides numerical or letter indices of
country risk. Managers incorporate these country risk assessments in
decisions regarding the location of foreign direct investment
projects. Thus, the purpose of these indices differs from the country
risk ratings provided by Institutional Investor or the Euromoney
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Country Assessment Reports which rank countries according to their
governments' creditworthiness. 2
While managers have been willing to pay fees of several thousand
dollars per year to subscribe to country risk assessment services,
serious questions regarding the validity and reliability of country
risk indices remain. The first section of this study discusses
concerns regarding the methodologies used to generate country risk
indices. As an alternative approach, this study proposes surveying
managers on their perceptions of environmental uncertainties in the
countries where they live and work. The study examines the extent to
which managers' perceptions of environmental uncertainties coincide
with country risk indices generated by professional risk assessment
services.
After the initial background discussion, this study presents a
simple instrument for measuring managers' perceptions of political,
government policy, and macroeconomic uncertainties. Empirical results
are presented based on a sample of nearly five hundred managers in 211
firms from six Latin American countries. In contrast to the
professional risk assessment indices, analyses of the sample data
indicate country uncertainties cannot be reduced to a single
unidimensional indicator. The latter portion of the paper presents
comparisons between managers' perceived environmental uncertainty




Kennedy (1987), drawing from West (1975), classified country risk
assessment approaches into three categories: expert-generated opinion,
component, and empirical-formal observational. The professional risk
assessment services generally rely on expert-generated opinion.
Component approaches combine both objective and subjective data to
measure the causes that contribute to country risk and aggregate the
components measures into a composite risk score. 3 The formal-empirical
observational approaches rely solely on quantitative country data for
developing econometric models that generate risk scores.·
~ing offers the following critique of the approach to risk
assessllient used by the syndicated risk-forecasting services:
... the empirical risk-assessment approaches are not based on
any conceptual foundations derived from the various relevant
disciplines. Most of them consist of systematic collection
and quantification of expert-generated data to produce the
risk indices. The so-called expert data in the Business
International case are generated by an international
research staff and in the WPRSs case, by canvassing a panel
of experts in the government, business, and academic
sectors. Their methodology essentially consists of
-quantifying- what are in fact subjectively derived data and
what therefore presents readers with an illusion of
objectivity. The major achievement or failure, depending on
one[']s perception, is the attempt to use a reductionist
line of thinking in risk analysis. A mass of amorphous
country data is mechanically reduced to a single number or
alphabetical grade (1988: 20).
Ting's criticisms of the methodologies used by risk forecasting
services can be summarized in three points: (1) they lack a
theoretically-grounded conceptual foundation for specifying risk
indicators; (2) the risk assessments depend on the subjective
evaluations of so-called Mexperts Mwho are not identified: and (3)
entire analyses are reduced to single measures through ad hoc
aggregation procedures. Often, aggregation takes place through highly
subjective weighting of various risk indicators. The weighted values
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of the various risk indicators are then summed to generate overall
risk measures. Together, these conceptual and methodological
weaknesses raise serious questions about the validity and reliability
of forecasting services' risk assessment indices. Despite these
problems, MNE managers continue to incorporate country risk indices in
their assessments of foreign direct investment projects.
This research presents an alternative approach to measuring
country risk. The methodology involves surveying top managers from a
variety of industries and countries as a basis for quantifying the
uncertainty of key environmental contingencies relevant to business
performance. This approach avoids reliance on a small sample of so-
called "experts" for deriving country risk assessments. Rather, the
uncertainties of doing business in a particular country are quantified
by sampling those for whom the risks are most salient, namely, the
managers of locally-owned and MNE subsidiary companies in a particular
country.
This study sought to determine whether managers' perceptions of
the uncertainty of their countries' are consistent with country risk
indices generated by professional risk assessment services. The study
examined the following hypothesis:
The rank order of countries based on managers' uncertainty
perceptions is consistent with the rank order provided by
country risk assessment services.
This hypothesis assumes both the uncertainty perceptions of in-country
managers and risk indices provided by country assessment services are
valid and reliable measures of the same country risk construct. If
this assumption does not hold, we would observe deviations between the
rank ordering provided by the two~ernativemeasures.
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MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT AND SAMPLE
This study used the instrument developed by Miller (1993) to
measure managers' uncertainty perceptions. The instrument includes a
list of environmental factors relevant to firm strategy and
performance. Managers ranked each of the items on a seven point
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (easy to predict) to 7
(unpredictable). The higher the score, the higher the perceived
uncertainty. This study includes only those PEU items that
demonstrated consistent responses across managers within firms.
Miller (1993), following Ebel (1951), measured item reliabilities
using a simple one-way ANOVA model to generate F tests for item
reliability. Only those items demonstrating adequate reliability
across top managers within firms (i.e., F test ratios significant at
the .05 level) were included in this study.
This study looks at the two categories of general environmental
uncertainty most frequently highlighted by international management
researchers--political and macroeconomic uncertainty. The political
uncertainty items are (1) ability of the party in power to maintain
control of the government, (2) threat of armed conflict; (3) tax
policies, (4) monetary policy, (5) legal regulations affecting the
business sector, (6) tariffs on imported goods, (7) enforcement of
existing laws, and (8) provision of public services. The
macroeconomic uncertainty items are (1) inflation rate, (2) exchange
rate with the dollar, and (3) results of economic restructuring. The
exchange rate with the dollar was chosen since the dollar is the
dominant currency for international transactions in Latin America, the
region where the sample was generated.
Managers in six Latin American countries (Costa Rica, El
7
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Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama) provided
responses to the questionnaire. The survey was administered in
Spanish.
For each firm in the sample, responses to the questionnaire items
were solicited in an interview with one of the members of the top
management team at their place of work. When possible, an additional
one or two managers from each firm completed a questionnaire
containing the same PEU items. No interview was conducted with the
questionnaire respondents. Since not all firms agreed to have
additional managers participate in the study, the number of
respondents per firm varied from one to three. A total of 497
managers from 211 firms provided usable responses. Table 1 shows the
distribution of the sample firms by ISIC code and country. The
uncertainty assessments presented by the managers in the sample
represent a broad cross-section of industries within each country.
**********************
Put Table 1 here
**********************
For each item, the responses of all managers within each firm
were averaged to obtain mean responses for each top management team.
The analyses reported in the remainder of the paper used the mean
scores.
TESTS FOR UNIDIMENSIONALITY
As noted earlier, the PEU measurement instrument included a total
of eight indicators of political uncertainty and three indicators of
macroeconomic uncertainty. Rather than assume these multiple
indicators could be aggregated into two general indices, the study
sought to evaluate whether the multiple indicators capture two unique
8
uncertainty constructs. This approach sought to avoid Ting's (1988)
criticism of professional risk assessment services that their
approaches to aggregating multiple risk indicators are ad hoc.
Principal components factor analysis was used to check for
unidimensionality among the multiple indicators for political and
macroeconomic uncertainties. This involved running separate factor
analyses on each set of indicators. Factors were retained if their
corresponding eigenvalues exceeded 1.0.
The eight political uncertainty indicators were clearly not
unidimensional. The top portion of Table 2 shows the principal
components factor loadings after an orthogonal varimax rotation. The
first factor shows high positive loadings on uncertainties regarding
tax policy, monetary policy, and legal regulations affecting the
business sector. The second factor has its highest loadings on the
uncertainties regarding the threat of armed conflict, the enforcement
of existing laws, and the provision of public services.
**********************
Put Table 2 here
**********************
The indicator for the ability of the party in power to maintain
control of the government has identical loadings on both factors.
This finding means that the indicator has equivalent positive
correlations with each of the two factors. As such, the indicator
does not clearly differentiate the two factors. Similarly, the
uncertainty associated with import tariffs has nearly identical
loadings on each of the two factors. In order to clearly
differentiate the two factors, the two uncertainty indicators--ability
of the party in power to maintain control of the government and
tariffs on imported goods--were dropped and the factor analysis
9
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results were obtained for the remaining six indicators.
The six indicator factor solution, shown in the lower portion of
Table 2, distinguishes two factors. Consistent with the eight
indicator factor pattern, the first factor has high positive loadings
on uncertainties regarding tax policy, monetary policy, and legal
regulations affecting the business sector. These three indicators
capture government policy uncertainty. The second factor, with high
positive loadings on the uncertainties regarding the threat of armed
conflict, the enforcement of existing laws, and the provision of
public services, can be interpreted as a measure of the instability of
the government, legal system, and government services. The factor can
be labeled political uncertainty.
The distinction between political and government policy
uncertainties encountered in the managerial data is consistent with
international management discussions. International management
researchers generally associate political uncertainty with major
changes in political regimes (Shubik, 1983; Ting, 1988). Policy
uncertainty, on the other hand, refers to the unpredictability of
government pOlicies that impact the business community (Ting, 1988).
The basis for separating the political and policy uncertainty
dimensions is that changes in governments do not necessarily result in
changes in government policies affecting business investments (Brewer,
1983; Kobrin, 1982) nor does political stability preclude policy
uncertainty. Some authors (e.g., Agmon, 1985; Bunn & Mustafaoglu,
1978) do not distinguish between political and policy uncertainties
but use the term "political risk N to encompass both of these
uncertainties. The empirical results in Table 2 indicate managers'
perceptions support the distinction between political and government
10
policy uncertainties.
The three macroeconomic uncertainty indicators, reflecting
uncertainty regarding the inflation rate, exchange rate, and the
results of economic restructuring, loaded on a single factor. Table 3
reports the factor analysis results for the macroeconomic uncertainty
indicators.
**********************
Put Table 3 here
**********************
Having conducted these tests for unidimensionality, total scores
for each of the variables--political uncertainty, policy uncertainty,
and macroeconomic uncertainty--were derived by calculating an
unweighted sum of the indicators for each variable. In the case of
the political and government policy two-factor solution (Table 2b),
indicators were added into only the measure for which they had their
highest factor loadings. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics on
each of the three composite variables. 6 Since each variable consists
of three indicators scored on a seven-point scale, the possible scores
range from three to twenty-one.
**********************
Put Table 4 here
**********************
The final column of Table 4 reports the Cronbach (1951)
coefficient alpfi~3 for the component items of each variable. Nunnally
(1967) suggests a 0.5 cutoff for the lower bound on scale reliability.
The policy and macroeconomic variables show high scale reliabilities.
The political uncertainty reliability is just slightly below
Nunnally's suggested criterion. In general, the results demonstrate
acceptable inter-item reliabilities for the composite variables.
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COMPARISONS OF MANAGERS' ONCERTAl:NTIES
AND COUNTRY RISK INDICES
This portion of the research examined whether managerial
perceptions of environmental uncertainties in their respective
countries are consistent with the risk assessments provided by a
professional rating service. At issue was whether the rank orderings
of the countries along the political, policy, and macroeconomic
uncertainty dimensions are consistent with published country risk
assessment ratings.
Access to many of the syndicated country risk assessment services
is costly. Thus, for comparison purposes, this study made use of
Political Risk Services' 1991 world political risk forecast available
in Plannina Review (Coplin & O'Leary, 1991). As is the case with
other risk assessment services (e.g., Business Environmental Risk
Information, International Reports' International Country Risk Guide,
a~d Business International Country Assessment Service), the PRS
methodology involves aggregating data from a panel of experts to
generate country risk ratings. 7
Coplin and O'Leary provide lS-month and five-year risk ratings
for turmoil, financial transfers, direct investment, and exports to
the country. The lS-month direct investment index is most likely to
capture the perspective of managers in firms actually operating in the
countries. The ratings run from A+ (least risk) to D- (most risk).
The reported PRS ratings for the Central American countries and Panama
were updated between September, 1990, and January, 1991. This
corresponds closely to the data collection time period for this study-
-July, 1990, through February, 1991. The rank ordering (least to
highest) of the Central American countries and Panama on the lS-month
direct investment risk scale is Panama (A), Costa Rica (A-), Honduras
12
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(A-), Nicaragua (B-), Guatemala (B-), and EI Salvador (B-). The five-
year investment risk ratings are similar: Panama (A), Costa Rica (A),
Honduras (A-), Nicaragua (B), Guatemala (B-), and EI Salvador (C+).
Comparison of the managers' reported political, policy, and
macroeconomic uncertainty scores used the Tukey method of multiple
pairwise comparisons (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). Since all
pairwise comparisons are of interest, the Tukey method leads to
narrower confidence intervals than the Bonferroni method (Neter,
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). The Tukey method is conservative when the
sample sizes are unequal, as is the case across the six countries in
this sample. The sizes of the confidence intervals differ from one
pair of countries to another because country sample sizes differ (see
Table 1). The actual confidence intervals are not reported in order
to reduce the complexity of the three tables.
Since the numbers of firms differ across the six countries, the
sample is unbalanced. As such, the appropriate analysis of variance
methodology is the regression approach to ANOVA (Neter, Wasserman, &
Kutner, 1985). This method was implemented using the SAS (1985)
generalized least squares procedure. F statistics for the political,
policy, and macroeconomic uncertainty ANOVA models indicate
significant country effects (p < .001).
Tables 5, 6, and 7 order the countries from low to high (left to
right) on the political, policy, and macroeconomic uncertainty scales,
respectively. The tables list the average uncertainty score across
all firms in each country. For each country, a bar indicates the
other countries with mean uncertainty scores that are not
sta~1stically different from its own mean. The country names
appearing above and below the bar show no significant difference from
13
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The multiple pairwise comparisons used
a family confidence coefficient of .95. The absence of a bar under or
over some country name signifies that the data indicate a significant
difference in the countries' uncertainty levels.
The political uncertainty ANOVA indicates significant differences
across countries but the uncertainty confidence intervals overlap
broadly. As shown in Table 5, Costa Rica, with the lowest level of
political uncertainty, is significantly lower than all of the other
countries except El Salvador. The lack of statistically significant
differences between El Salvador and Costa Rica is surprising given the
relative levels of political turmoil in these two countries in the
last decade.
**********************
Put Table 5 here
**********************
On the policy dimension (Table 6), El Salvador and Panama show
significantly lower uncertainty levels than Costa Rica, Honduras, and
Guatemala. The close proximity of the data collection period to the
Guatemalan elections may partially account for the high policy
uncertainty expressed by managers in that country.
**********************
Put Table 6 here
**********************
The macroeconomic uncertainty scale in Table 7
indicates that Panamanian managers expressed significantly lower
uncertainty than their counterparts in any of the other five nations.
Honduras registered a significantly higher level of macroeconomic
uncertainty than Costa Rica and EI Salvador, as well as Panama. One
of the factors accounting for Panama's exceptionally low macroeconomic
uncertainty is the pegging of their currency at par with the dollar.
14
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When the exchange rate stability item is dropped in calculating the
macroeconomic uncertainty score, Panama remains the lowest uncertainty
country but its difference with El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala
is no longer statistically significant.
**********************
Put Table 7 here
**********************
Looking across the three scales, the policy and macroeconomic
scales indicate the same pairs of low (Panama and El Salvador), medium
(Costa Rica and Nicaragua), and high (Guatemala and Honduras)
uncertainty countries. Thus, managers' responses on the policy and
macroeconomic uncertainty scales show some consistency.
By contrast, the lack of ordinal stability in the country
rankings between the political scale and the other two scales is
striking. These results, as well as the earlier factor analysis, raise
serious questions about reducing country risk down to a single
measure. Panama, for example, registered the lowest macroeconomic
uncertainty and second lowest policy uncertainty. This occurred
despite having relative high uncertainty regarding the stability of
the current government (second only to Nicaragua). The World
Political Risk Services (WPRS) l8-month direct investment index
ranking of A for Panama clearly does not reflect managerial
uncertainty regarding the stability of the government.
The WPRS rankings do not appear to be a good proxy for managerial
uncertainty perceptions on any of the three scales. Whereas Panama
(graded A) and E1 Salvador (graded C+) are at the extremes on the WPRS
five-year investment risk scale, these countries are close to each
other for the policy and macroeconomic ur.-::ertainty proxies devE'ed
in this research. Honduras, ranking an A- from the WPRS for bo:.::, the
15
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lS-month and five-year time frames, proves to be much more uncertain
when viewed from the perspective of local managers.
It is possible that the uncertainty perceptions of top management
teams of locally-owned companies and MNE subsidiaries differ.
Differences could be due to the greater influence of headquarters'
management on MNE subsidiary managers' perceptions of their local
environment. MNE's greater propensity to use expatriate managers in
foreign subsidiaries could also contribute to differences in
uncertainty perceptions. Furthermore, MNEs have available a variety
of risk management tools which may be costly or impossible to
duplicate in a local business. For example, when faced with foreign
exchange volatility, MNEs can use exposure netting or operational
flexibility to reduce income stream volatility. The greater range of
financial and operational risk management tactics available to MNEs
may result in lower perceived risk among MNE subsidiary managers than
local firm managers.
The 211-firm data set included 67 firms indicating some foreign
ownership. These 67 firms have foreign ownership ranging from 100
percent to a minority·stake. Within each country sample, ANOVA tests
did not, in general, indicate significant differences (at the .05
level) in perceived uncertainties between MNE and locally-owned firm
managers. s For each country, living and working in the same political,
policy, and macroeconomic environment, tends to homogenize uncertainty




This study proposed using the responses of top managers within
countries to PEU questionnaire items to generate country risk
assessments. The approach represents a fourth methodology for
generating country risk assessments beyond those noted by Kennedy
(1987). The rationale behind this approach is that top managers may
be in the best position to assess the uncertainties of doing business
in their respective countries.
The findings from this study indicate managers differentiate the
levels of uncertainty regarding political and government policy
uncertainties. While the policy and macroeconomic uncertainty scales
lead to similar rank orderings of the sample countries, the ordering
based on political uncertainty was quite distinct. This finding
supports the distinction between political and policy uncertainties
found in previous international management research (e.g., Brewer,
1983; Kobrin, 1982). It also challenges the professional risk
assessment practice of consolidating all risk information into a
single country measure.
Since the rank order of the country political uncertainty levels
was not found to be consistent with the policy and macroeconomic
scales, the question remains as to how these distinct uncertainties
affect firm behavior. Rather than simply looking at corporate
responses to political uncertainty, future research could consider
strategic responses to political uncertainty in the context of varying
levels of macroeconomic and policy uncertainties.
The lack of agreement between the managerial rankings and the
country risk indices is troubling and deserves further research. The
evidence suggests significant differences between managers'
17
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uncertainty perceptions and the risk assessments provided by
"experts."
An important reason for the lack of agreement between the country
risk assessment and the managerial PEU measures may be a difference in
the underlying construct sought. The country risk measures reflect an
understanding of risk as probability of loss-inducing events (i.e.,
downside risk). on the other hand, the perceived uncertainty scales
developed in this research seek to measure the unpredictability of
environmental events as perceived by managers. Unpredictability could
result in either positive or negative firm performance deviations from
expectations. An important research question is whether uncertainty
or downside risk is most relevant to managerial decisions. While
uncertainty has received widespread attention in organization theory
and strategy, some studies (e.g., Aaker & Jacobson, 1990; Baird &
Thomas, 1990; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; March & Shapira, 1987)
suggest downside risk is more relevant to managerial decisions.
Managerial uncertainty ratings are not without the potential for
certain biases (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982).
Specifically, managerial evaluations of uncertainties may be subject
to biases due to event availability and anchoring on different points
in the uncertainty scales. Availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman,
1973) arises because subjective evaluations of the probability of a
given event may be strongly influenced by the ease with which
instances can be recalled from earlier information or past experience.
Anchoring and adjustment (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974) occurs when people making subjective estimates start
from different initial values and adjust from their starting points to
determine the estimates.
18
Differences in the managers' anchoring points for uncertainty
assessments within countries would increase the variance of the
country uncertainty estimates. Nevertheless, if the anchoring points
were randomly distributed, ther~ would be no resulting bias in the
aggregate country uncertainty score. If there were systematic
differences in the anchoring points across countries, this would
create problems for intercountry comparisons.
Despite the potential biases in managers' uncertainty
perceptions, the use of large sample managerial evaluations of
uncertainties presents an interesting (and, prior to this research,
unexplored) alternative to reliance on country uexperts U for
generating country risk assessments. The use of a large number of
managers with experience in a variety of industries may reduce the
extent of the biases relative to those generated by polling a few
-experts.- The methodology developed in this study also allows us to
calculate confidence intervals and determine whether or not
differences across countries are significant. Whether the differences
between professional risk assessment rankings (e.g., A versus B) for
countries are significant or not is unclear.
Further research is needed to determine whether the professional
risk assessment indices or managers' uncertainty perceptions better
predict firm strategic decisions and subsequent environmental changes.
Until such research, the evidence from this study suggests surveying
managers in potential host countries may be an important complement to





1.Kennedy (1987) documents the growth in corporate country risk
analysis in the 1970s and 1980s.
2.Cosset and Roy (1991) evaluated the Euromoney and Institutional
Investor ratings of country creditworthiness.
3.For examples of component models see Haendel (1979) and Green
(1974) .
4.Knudsen (1974) and Hibbs (1973) are some early examples of this
approach.
5.WPRS indicates World Political Risk Services. In the discussion, we
use the current title, Political Risk Services (FRS).
6.0ne firm did not provide data on the policy uncertainty scale items.
This accounts for the difference in sample sizes across the three
uncertainty variables.
7.Kobrin (1982: 205-207) describes and critiques the process used by
PRS to generate country risk assessments.
8.Since the sample sizes for MNE and locally-owned firms were·
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Distribution of Firms in Sample
ISIC 1 ISIC 3 ISIC 4 ISIC 5
Agriculture Manufacturing Utilities Construction
Costa Rica 0 18 0 0
El Salvador 4 19 1 1
Guatemala 1 7 0 5
Honduras 4 16 1 3
Nicaragua 1 11 1 2
Panama 0 13 0 1
TOTAL 10 84 3 12
ISIC 6 ISIC 7 ISIC 8 ISlC 9




Costa Rica 11 2 7 0 38
El Salvador 7 1 4 0 37
Guatemala 11 2 10 0 36
Honduras 7 1 9 1 42
Nicaragua 14 1 1 1 32
Panama 8 1 1 2 26
TOTAL 58 8 32 4 211
-----
-----
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Codes (United
Nations, 1971):
1: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing
2: Mining and Quarrying
3: Manufacturing
4: Electricity, Gas, and Water
5: Construction
6: Wholesale and Retail Trade and Restaurants and Hotels
7: Transport, Storage, and Communication
8: Financing, Insurance, Real Estate, and Business Services
9: Community, Social, and Personal Services
24
TABLE 2
Political and Policy Uncerta~ties Factor Pattern
(a) Eight Indicators
FACTOR1 FACTOR2 Communalities
Tax policies. 0.838 0.088 0.710
Monetary policy. 0.830 -0.110 0.701
Legal regulations affecting
the business sector. 0.638 0.432 0.594
Threat of armed conflict. 0.022 0.538 0.290
Enforcement of existing laws. 0.190 0.662 0.474
Public service provision. -0.009 0.745 0.555
Ability of the party in power
to maintain control of the
government. 0.426 0.426 0.363
Tariffs on imported goods. 0.476 0.493 0.470











Threat of armed conflict.
































Macroeconomic Uncertainty Factor Pattern
FACTOR1 Communalities
Inflation rate.
Exchange rate with dollar.


























































































Multiple Pairwise Comparison of Country
Macroeconomic Uncertainties
HIGH UNCERTAINTY
Honduras
15.89
I
Guatemala
14.41
I
Nicaragua
14.04
I
Costa Rica
12.68
I
El Salvador
12.46
-Panama
9.74
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